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NASA STI Program…in Profile 
 
 
Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated  
to the advancement of aeronautics and space 
science. The NASA scientific and technical 
information (STI) program plays a key part in 
helping NASA maintain this important role. 
 
The NASA STI program operates under the 
auspices of the Agency Chief Information 
Officer. It collects, organizes, provides for 
archiving, and disseminates NASA’s STI. The 
NASA STI program provides access to the 
NTRS Registered and its public interface, the 
NASA Technical Reports Server, thus 
providing one of the largest collections of 
aeronautical and space science STI in the 
world. Results are published in both non-
NASA channels and by NASA in the NASA 
STI Report Series, which includes the 
following report types: 
 
• TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports 
of completed research or a major 
significant phase of research that present 
the results of NASA programs and 
include extensive data or theoretical 
analysis. Includes compilations of 
significant scientific and technical data 
and information deemed to be of 
continuing reference value. NASA 
counterpart of peer-reviewed formal 
professional papers but has less stringent 
limitations on manuscript length and 
extent of graphic presentations. 
 
• TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM. 
Scientific and technical findings that are 
preliminary or of specialized interest, 
e.g., quick release reports, working 
papers, and bibliographies that contain 
minimal annotation. Does not contain 
extensive analysis. 
 
• CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientific 
and technical findings by NASA-
sponsored contractors and grantees. 
• CONFERENCE PUBLICATION. 
Collected papers from scientific and 
technical conferences, symposia, 
seminars, or other meetings 
sponsored or co-sponsored by 
NASA. 
 
• SPECIAL PUBLICATION. 
Scientific, technical, or historical 
information from NASA programs, 
projects, and missions, often 
concerned with subjects having 
substantial public interest. 
 
• TECHNICAL TRANSLATION. 
English-language translations of 
foreign scientific and technical 
material pertinent to NASA’s 
mission. 
 
Specialized services also include creating 
custom thesauri, building customized 
databases, and organizing and publishing 
research results. 
 
For more information about the NASA STI 
program, see the following: 
 
• Access the NASA STI program home 
page at http://www.sti.nasa.gov 
 
• E-mail your question via the Internet to 
help@sti.nasa.gov 
 
• Phone the NASA STI Help Desk at  
(757) 864-9658 
 
• Write to: 
NASA STI Information Desk 
Mail Stop 148 
NASA Langley Research Center 
Hampton, VA 23681-2199 
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Concepts for the Design of Human-Autonomy Systems 
 
 
Mary M. Connors1 
 
 
 
 
Preface 
Over the last two years a number of workshops or similar meetings have been held under the 
auspice of NASA Ames Research Center that, although dealing with different primary foci, 
considered at some level the cross-cutting topic of humans-autonomous systems and the 
partnership between them. This publication presents findings from the reports of these meetings 
as they inform the process of designing autonomous systems to work in conjunction with 
humans. Some workshops were highly relevant to this question, others less so. Drawing from 
conclusions in these reports, this publication presents, at a high level, a summary of issues that 
could usefully be considered in the design process of automated systems working with human 
agents. Although differing in emphases, reports from the several workshops reflect many similar 
beliefs regarding human-autonomy teaming (HAT). Conclusions can be viewed as generally 
applicable to various aviation venues—air, ground, and air-ground interacions. 
 
The objective of the workshops was primarily to identify issues, concerns, and research needs 
associated with evolving human-autonomy systems—not in providing solutions. The analysis 
herewithin is generally limited to the findings in the workshop reports. And, since there was 
often commonality in findings among the several reports, no attempt is made to ascribe particular 
findings or observations to particular reports.  
 
The meeting reports consulted for this review are as follows:  
• Transitioning to Autonomy: Changes in the Role of Humans in the Air Transportation 
System, April 2015. 
• UTM Convention, July 2015. 
• AIAA, ISTC, Intelligent Systems in Aerospace, January 2016. 
• Assurance for Autonomy Systems, January 2016. 
 
  
                                                
1 NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California. 
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1. Introduction 
Common to all the reports reviewed was the assumption that, although the capabilities of humans 
can be expected to remain more or less constant, autonomy and autonomous systems will 
continue to advance rapidly. Increasing the role of autonomy depends on the development of 
adaptive, non-deterministic systems. It is generally agreed that, although direct human 
involvement in these systems will be needed for years to come, this involvement will decrease 
over time, at least at the level of the operator. This predicted shift from human to autonomy 
changes the balance from the present environment where the human is assumed to compensate 
for safety gaps, to future operations where the automated system and its designers will bear 
increasing responsibility for both performance and safety. The path of the advancement of 
autonomy systems will depend to a large extent on advances in machine learning and 
computational intelligence tools. And, as today, the challenge for designers will be heavily 
weighted towards dealing with unexpected and hazardous conditions in dynamically changing 
environments. Further complicating these technological developments is the question of cyber-
security, i.e., how to protect while developing. 
 
In addition to effectiveness and safety, designs will also need to be reliable. The approach 
needed for future design goes well beyond the characteristics of individual components or of 
interconnected components and must include the full integration of hardware, software, and 
liveware into a highly functioning human-autonomty teaming system. 
 
Combining human(s) and automation system(s) in a true teaming arrangement, at the level being 
discussed, is a new and challenging endeavor. It requires new architectures, new frameworks, 
new organizational categories, and new methods for standardization. While learning to operate in 
this emerging environment, designers should keep in mind that the more complex a system (in 
terms of goals, tasks, number and types of vehicles, environment and the like) the more difficult 
the implementation; conversely, the more closed the system (e.g., geofenced) and the more 
controllable the conditions of the system, the easier it is to implement. In other words, a guiding 
principle is to simplify to the extent possible for the system of interest. 
 
2. Planning for Design 
In considering the specifics of design, the potential contributions that could be made by both 
humans and machines need to be included. There is general agreement that, at least for the 
foreseeable future, adaptive automation should be human-driven. As such, the designer should 
consider the strengths and weaknesses, not only of the automation but also of the human partner. 
For instance, are the flexibility and resilience characteristics of the human important to the 
design? And, if so, how can these characteristics be preserved in the design? The designer should 
consider also the differences in how humans and automation maximize performance. Humans 
tend to sub-optimize, leaving themselves “wiggle room” to deal with unanticipated events. For 
autonomous agents, the choice tends to be to optimize at every level, from component to system. 
The designer needs to determine which approach is preferable for the particular design under 
consideration or whether there is a way to combine the two approaches. 
 
2.1 Common Features 
Planning design of a human-autonomy system should assure that, where applicable, the system is 
capable of moving easily from one generation to the next and should take into consideration if 
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and how the objectives or policies of the mission might change. Another early planning decision 
involves the extent to which the system will be prepared to address off-nominal, rare events. It is 
frequently opined that events that can be imagined should be considered in the design. But, while 
considering the possibilities, it may be impractical to plan for every considered event. So, the 
question remains as to whether events that can be imagined but are considered highly improbable 
should be included in the design. 
 
2.2 Models 
The reports reviewed addressed the need for new models (as well as new methods, simulation 
scenarios, and evaluation techniques) to support design progress and particularly to deal with 
probabilistic or uncertain events. Better models of humans, of autonomy, and particularly of 
human-autonomy systems are clearly needed to give designers a means of predicting how 
systems will be used and the consequences, both intended and untended, that are likely to follow. 
 
2.3 Metrics 
If automation and human-autonomy teaming are to advance, numerous improvements in metrics 
are needed. Evaluating the impact of non-deterministic systems presents important challenges to 
moving beyond the formal methods and analysis techniques presently available. For autonomy 
and for human-automation teams, performance-based results are needed that can quantify the 
benefits (or lack thereof) in autonomous and teamed systems. Specific to the design process, it is 
necessary to include an approach for determining if changes to autonomy are safe and beneficial 
to the system as a whole. This approach will be needed to assess efficiency and effectiveness as 
they affect total system performance in real-world environments.  
 
2.4 Risk 
Due to their greater probability of success, situations of low environmental risk offer more 
possibilities for automating than situations of higher risk. Developers can further lower risk by 
structuring conditions to be as narrow as feasible for the system, its intended application, and its 
potential future growth. And, development should avoid “feature creep” by basing development 
on the requirements of the system, not the capability or potential capability of computational 
intelligence. Field-testing will be required at different stages of development and field tests 
should be conducted in as low risk environment as appropriate. 
 
2.5 Costs 
Cost considerations should include all life cycle costs for both the machine and the human. 
Machine costs include maintenance, environmental (e.g., location fees, the need for wideband or 
special communications) and production resources; human costs include training for all agents 
involved. New methods of training are likely to be needed. Automation should be developed to 
minimize human training needs—initial, recurrent, and operational. More generally, planners 
should be able to quantitatively justify the benefits of advanced automation over traditional 
methods with reference to costs and mission requirements.   
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3. Bench Design 
Every design begins with assumptions of what the system will be used for, what the 
environment will be like, and what the operator or controller of the system will be expected to 
do. It is important to make those assumptions explicit, and to assure that these assumptions are 
correct, especially with regard to human capabilities and what the human partner’s 
responsibilities will be.  
 
3.1 General Requirements 
Unless otherwise determined, it can be assumed that the design is required to be resilient under 
uncertainty and able to capture and operate in complex and dynamically changing situations. 
While virtually all designs strive for efficiency, reliability, and scalability, other general 
requirements also need to be considered, especially in a human-autonomy teaming system. The 
autonomous system should: 
• Provide for a shared mental model. 
• Be able to convey its goals and have a way of knowing the goals of the human partner. 
• Provide for intuitive ease of use (preferably involving natural language and aided by 
inputs from subject matter experts). 
• Make clear who is in control when and how control is passed. 
• Establish a balance between functionality and usability. 
• Design-in sufficient involvement for the human team member to retain his/her 
proficiencies. 
• Develop with knowledge of, and in parallel with, operational approaches. 
 
3.2 Intent 
A critically important and highly challenging requirement to human-autonomy teaming is the 
issue of conveying intent. Sharing intent is necessary to make actions predictable. Both agents 
must be able to discern what the other intends to do. From the standpoint of system design, the 
autonomy must be able to indicate to the human its intent and, to the extent possible, interpret the 
human partner’s intent.  
 
3.3 Information 
A basic consideration in the design of a system is the organization and presentation of 
information, i.e., providing the right information to the right location at the right time. The 
information provided to the system must be accurate and timely and the system must be capable 
of interpreting and acting on it—not just pushing it (and the problem) out to the human. The 
machine system must have knowledge of both the activities to be accomplished and the 
environment in which the system will or could function. System designers should decide how 
much the human agent needs to understand of the machine’s processes as well as how to support 
this understanding.  
 
Both machine and human agents require the capability of sharing data for integrated analysis and 
decision-making. Both agents also require information concerning what the other is doing and 
when the other is reaching its limits. 
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Communication between agents and interconnectivity among sub-elements require some form of a 
common language, along with a substructure to support information requirements and exchange. 
 
3.4 Transitioning 
When activities are transitioned between agents or elements, this transition should be both 
observable and seamless. It is particularly important when the transition is system-to-human that 
the process be clear and, preferably, intuitive to the human.  
 
3.5 Timing 
The designer should be aware of the differences in how automation and humans deal with timing 
and scheduling processes. While humans can approach a solution from many sides, machines, 
presently and in general, require that processes be completed within certain time constraints and 
following prescribed sequences. Too often the timing constraints and sequencing requirements of 
the machine are not obvious to the human and are not made explicit by the system.  
 
3.6 Monitoring 
For some time to come, monitoring will be a primary means of assuring system safety. To this 
end, it is necessary that the human and the autonomous system be capable of monitoring each 
other. Autonomy, eventually, should be able to determine when the human is unable to function 
effectively. For instance, this might be done based on a psychophysical measure (e.g., reaction 
time) or by a physiological measures (e.g., eye movement). Human monitoring of the 
performance of the automated system presents the challenge of designing a level of monitoring 
that will not burden users nor bore them and cause them to lose attention. One suggestion in 
support of human monitoring is to “monitor by exception,” i.e., to involve the human agent in 
monitoring the automation when something unusual happens. However, if the attention of the 
human is required only rarely, the system must be designed to bring the user back “into the 
loop,” thus allowing the user to catch up on what is needed and to know what to do. Since 
automation tends to change rapidly, it has been suggested that implementation of advances in 
machine systems be linked to monitoring procedures so that the automation does not outpace the 
performance capability of the human monitor. 
 
3.7 Trust and Transparency 
It falls to the designer to ensure that the system is trustworthy, i.e., has a high level of validity 
and reliability. But future systems also will require a sufficiently high level of user “trust” in the 
automated actions being performed. An approach to encouraging trust in the system is for the 
machine partner to provide the user the bases for its decisions. Such transparency allows the 
human partner to know that what the automation is doing is (or is not) correct. Such transparency 
is needed both to establish and to maintain trust. While questions remain concerning how much 
transparency is needed or desirable to foster trust (without overloading the user) the design must 
provide the operator with sufficient information to know when the automation is making a 
questionable decision or when the automation itself is struggling with the decision. At a 
minimum, a process must be included for querying the automation as to the bases for and 
confidence in its actions. While encouraging trust, the system must actively engage the human to 
avoid “over-trusting” or complacency on the part of the human agent.  
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3.8 Workload 
Design must take into consideration the workload imposed on the operator—both task workload 
and cognitive workload—remembering that teaming itself changes the nature of human work 
and can itself add to workload. But the workload considered should go beyond that of the 
operator and consider also any additional burden that might fall on, e.g., air traffic controllers or 
other service providers.  
 
3.9 System Failure 
Aeronautic systems should be designed to refuse-to-crash and to include emergency auto-land 
capability. One area of particular concern is the problem of lost links and data link failures. 
Another critical aspect associated with system failure is the ability to “fail gracefully.” Failing 
gracefully implies a gradual deterioration process, but one that also keeps the human in the 
knowledge loop, allowing control to be transferred to the human partner and enabling 
uninterrupted system recovery.  
 
3.10 Validation and Safety 
The designer must provide for an active validation process for the system as a whole as well as 
for a crosschecking capability to ensure that safety-related items are not missed. Particular 
attention should be paid to autonomy-to-human and human-to-autonomy transitions. New 
concepts or elements should be field- or flight-tested in the full system as significant changes or 
additions to the autonomy element are made. 
 
3.11 Certification 
Certification will be a major barrier to adoption of automation in the aeronautics domain since no 
adaptive, non-deterministic system has yet been certified nor have the bases for certification of 
adaptive systems been established. Acknowledging the extreme difficulty in addressing this 
problem through existing procedures, a number of workshop participants suggested reversing the 
emphasis from specifying what a system will do to guaranteeing what a system will never do. A 
further suggestion involves licensing uses rather than certifying systems. Addressing the highly 
complicated certification issue goes well beyond system design and will involve the skilled 
attention of many levels of organization. However, the designer can at least consider, and 
attempt to address, what the concerns of the certifying (or licensing) authority will be. 
 
4. Industry Design Considerations 
Industry’s approach to automation must take into account the need to transition from where we 
are now to where we will be as intelligent systems continue to advance. This long-term industry 
approach will encourage public acceptance and trust of intelligent systems generally. Although 
the designers of individual systems need to pursue simplicity (an emphasis on the particular), the 
industry as a whole should look for ways to develop general-purpose systems and to encourage 
the use of open architectures. 
 
 If automation is to reach its true potential, the industry must come together in two specific 
ways—standardization and sharing. In terms of standardization, a question that needs to be 
addressed is: How will multiple autonomous agents from different developers communicate 
with each other? Growth requires that information technology interfaces, taxonomies, and 
  
7 
 
lexicons be standardized2. The requirement for sharing presents a similar challenge. Developers 
will be learning-by-doing and a collaborative approach to sharing data, experiences and best 
practices is needed. 
 
Certification, or a substitute practice, will constitute a daunting challenge for non-deterministic 
agents and for human-autonomy systems. Surmounting this barrier will be greatly aided by 
industry’s willingness to formulate standards and to share experiences.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The reports of several workshops dealing with changes in the human-autonomy relationship were 
examined with a view towards design requirements. Some of these workshops were highly 
relevant to the question of human-autonomy teaming and its design; others were only 
tangentially related. But all had something to offer to this evolving area. From examining the 
reports of these workshops, it was concluded that results could be considered under three 
headings: (1) Planning for Design; (2) Bench Design; and (3) Industry Design Considerations. 
The information described provides a high-level assessment based on the workshop results. 
These findings can serve as pointers to areas that will require greater attention in the future than 
has been demanded in the past. 
 
A general conclusion that was broadly endorsed by participants of the workshops is that testing 
of new and evolving systems should include representative field trials. A follow-on conclusion 
was that these trials should progress from less risky to more risky situations, from less 
challenging to more challenging operations. These conclusions are an acknowledgement of the 
high level of uncertainty associated with adaptive systems with reference to our present 
understanding of these systems and the complexity of real-world conditions in which these 
systems are expected to operate. 
 
As automation advances, the responsibility for the safe performance of the human-autonomy 
team will move in the direction of the autonomous agent. While in the past the human operator 
has been assigned responsibility for filling gaps left by a deterministic agent, adaptive systems 
will now be expected to bear their share of the responsibility burden. Since only humans are 
ultimately accountable and liable, this re-scoping of roles represents a shift of responsibility from 
the user or operator to the developer or designer.  
 
Since so much is yet to be learned, successful implementation of automation and human-
automation teams depends to a large extent, on the ability of industry leaders to share 
information and experiences and to standardize where feasible. Such sharing and standardization 
are needed to begin to formulate a path to a certification solution. 
 
  
                                                
2 A serious complication to the goal of standardization is cyber-security. Where common elements with 
intelligent components are used, the opportunity for hacking, resulting in unsafe conditions, is increased 
and must be considered in the decision process. 
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